SECT. 32.] Induction. 233 



be merged into one, or at any rate to have their functions 

 confounded. 



32. Since the generalization of our statistics is found to 

 belong to Induction, this process of generalization may be 

 regarded as prior to, or at least independent of, Probability. 

 We have, moreover, already discussed (in Chapter vi.) the 

 step corresponding to what are termed immediate inferences, 

 and (in Chapter vn.) that corresponding to syllogistic infer 

 ences. Our present position therefore is that in which we 

 may consider ourselves in possession of any number of gene 

 ralizations, but wish to employ them so as to make inferences 

 about a given individual; just as in one department of 

 common logic we are engaged in finding middle terms to 

 establish the desired conclusion. In this latter case the 

 process is found to be extremely simple, no accumulation of 

 different middle terms being able to lead to any real ambi 

 guity or contradiction. In Probability, however, the case is 

 different. Here, if we attempt to draw inferences about the 

 individual case before us, as often is attempted in the Rule 

 of Succession for example we shall encounter the full force 

 of this ambiguity and contradiction. Treat the question, 

 however, fairly, and all difficulty disappears. Our inference 

 really is not about the individuals as individuals, but about 

 series or successions of them. We wished to know whether 

 John Smith will die within the year; this, however, cannot 

 be known. But John Smith, by the possession of many 

 attributes, belongs to many different series. The multi 

 plicity of middle terms, therefore, is what ought to be 

 expected. We can know whether a succession of men, resi 

 dents in India, consumptives, &c. die within a year. We 

 may make our selection, therefore, amongst these, and in the 

 long run the belief and consequent conduct of ourselves and 

 other persons (as described in Chapter vi.) will become 



