CHAPTER X. 



CHANCE AS OPPOSED TO CAUSATION AND DESIGN. 



1. THE remarks in the previous chapter will have served 

 to clear the way for an enquiry which probably excites more 

 popular interest than any other within the range of our subject, 

 viz. the determination whether such and such events are to 

 be attributed to Chance on the one hand, or to Causation or 

 Design on the other. As the principal difficulty seems to 

 arise from the ambiguity with which the problem is generally 

 conceived and stated, owing to the extreme generality of the 

 conceptions involved, it becomes necessary to distinguish 

 clearly between the several distinct issues which are apt to 

 be involved. 



I. There is, to begin with, a very old objection, founded 

 on the assumption which our science is supposed to make of 

 the existence of Chance. The objection against chance is 

 of course many centuries older than the Theory of Pro 

 bability ; and as it seems a nearly obsolete objection at the 

 present day we need not pause long for its consideration. 

 If we spelt the word with a capital C, and maintained that 

 it was representative of some distinct creative or adminis 

 trative agency, we should presumably be guilty of some form 

 of Manicheism. But the only rational meaning of the ob- 



