242 Chance, Causation, and Design. [CHAP. x. 



7. Again, another deficiency in such reasoning seems 

 to be the laying undue weight upon the mere regularity or 

 persistency of the statistics. These may lead to very im 

 portant results, but they are not exactly what is wanted 

 for the purpose of proving anything against the freedom 

 of the will ; it is not indeed easy to see what connection 

 this has with such facts as that the annual number of thefts 

 or of suicides remains at pretty nearly the same figure. 

 Statistical uniformity seems to me to establish nothing else, 

 at least directly, in the case of human actions, than it does 

 in that of physical characteristics. Take but one instance, 

 that of the misdirected letters. We were already aware 

 that the height, weight, chest measurement, and so on, of 

 a large number of persons preserved a tolerably regular 

 average amidst innumerable deflections, and we were pre 

 pared by analogy to anticipate the same regularity in their 

 mental characteristics. All that we gain, by counting the 

 numbers of letters which are posted without addresses, is 

 a certain amount of direct evidence that this is the case. 

 Just as observations of the former kind had already shown 

 that statistics of the strength and stature of the human 

 body grouped themselves about a mean, so do those of the 

 latter that a similar state of things prevails in respect of the 

 readiness and general trustworthiness of the memory. The 

 evidence is not so direct and conclusive in the latter case, 

 for the memory is not singled out and subjected to measure 

 ment by itself, but is taken in combination with innumerable 

 other influencing circumstances. Still there can be little 

 doubt that the statistics tell on the whole in this direction, 

 and that by duly varying and extending them they may 

 obtain considerable probative force. 



The fact is that Probability has nothing more to do with 

 Natural Theology, either in its favour or against it, than the 



