260 Chance, Causation, and Design. [CHAP. x. 



decide between chance and design as agencies must be con 

 fined to the case of finite intelligences. One of the im 

 portant determining elements here, as we have seen, is the 

 state of knowledge of the agent, and the conventional esti 

 mate entertained about this or that particular arrangement; 

 and these can be appreciated only when we are dealing with 

 beings like ourselves. 



For instance, to return to that much debated question 

 about the arrangement of the stars, there can hardly be any 

 doubt that what Mitchell who started the discussion -had 

 in view was the decision between Chance and Design. He 

 says (Trans. Roy. Soc. 1767) &quot;The argument I intend to 

 make use of... is of that kind which infers either design or 

 some general law from a general analogy and from the great 

 ness of the odds against things having been in the present 

 situation if it was not owing to some such cause.&quot; And he 

 concludes that had the stars &quot;been scattered by mere chance 

 as it might happen&quot; there would be &quot;odds of near 500000 

 to 1 that no six stars out of that number [1500], scattered at 

 random in the whole heavens, would be within so small a 

 distance from each other as the Pleiades are.&quot; Under any 

 such interpretation the controversy seems to me to be idle. 

 I do not for a moment dispute that there is some force in 

 the ordinary teleological argument which seeks to trace signs 

 of goodness and wisdom in the general tendency of things. 

 But what do we possibly understand about the nature of 

 creation, or the designs of the Creator, which should enable 

 us to decide about the likelihood of his putting the stars in 

 one shape rather than in another, or which should allow any 

 significance to &quot;mere chance&quot; as contrasted with his sup 

 posed all-pervading agency ? 



22. Reduced to intelligible terms the two following 

 questions seem to me to emerge from the controversy : 



