CHAPTER XL 



O.Y CERTAIN CONSEQUENCES OF THE OBJECTIVE TREAT 

 MENT OF A SCIENCE OF INFERENCE *. 



1. STUDENTS of Logic are familiar with that broad 

 distinction between the two methods of treatment to which 

 the names of Material and Conceptualist may be applied. 

 The distinction was one which had been gradually growing 

 up under other names before it was emphasized, and treated 

 as a distinction within the field of Logic proper, by the pub 

 lication of Mill s well known work. No one, for instance, 

 can read Whewell s treatises on Induction, or Herschel s 

 Discourse, without seeing that they are treating of much the 

 same subject matter, and regarding it in much the same 

 way, as that which Mill discussed under the name of Logic, 

 though they were not disposed to give it that name. That 

 is, these writers throughout took it for granted that what 

 they had to do was to systematise the facts of nature in 

 their objective form, and under their widest possible treat 

 ment, and to expound the principal modes of inference and 

 the principal practical aids in the investigation of these 



1 In the previous edition a large detailed discussion of the Law of 



part of this chapter was devoted to Causation, as I hope before very long 



the general consideration of the dis- to express my opinions on these sub- 



tinction between a Material and a jects more fully, and more appro - 



Conceptualist view of Logic. I have priately, in a treatise on the general 



omitted most of this here, as also a principles of Inductive Logic, 

 large part of a chapter devoted to the 



