SECT. 11.] Objective Treatment of Logic. 277 



their final destination in Logic, and our task is not accom 

 plished until they have reached it. 



11. Such language as this in which we speak of our 

 position in Probability as being that of entertaining a con 

 ception, and being occupied in determining what degree of 

 belief is to be assigned to it, may savour of Conceptualism, 

 but is in spirit perfectly different from it. Our ultimate 

 reference is always to facts. We start from them as our data, 

 and reach them again eventually in our results whenever it 

 is possible. In Probability, of course, we cannot do this in 

 the individual result, but even then (as shown in Ch. vi.) we 

 always justify our conclusions by appeal to facts, viz. to what 

 happens in the long run. 



The discussion which has been thus given to this part of 

 the subject may seem somewhat tedious, but it was so ob 

 viously forced upon us when considering the distinction 

 between the two main views of Logic, that it was impossible 

 to pass it over without fear of misapprehension and confu 

 sion. Moreover, as will be seen in the course of the next 

 chapter, several important conclusions could not have been 

 properly explained and justified without first taking pains 

 to make this part of our ground perfectly plain and satis 

 factory. 



