CHAPTER XII. 



CONSEQUENCES OF THE FOREGOING DISTINCTIONS. 



1. WE are now in a position to explain and justify some 

 important conclusions which, if not direct consequences of 

 the distinctions laid down in the last chapter, will at any 

 rate be more readily appreciated and accepted after that 

 exposition. 



In the first place, it will be seen that in Probability time 

 has nothing to do with the question ; in other words, it does 

 not matter whether the event, whose probability we are dis 

 cussing, be past, present, or future. The problem before us, 

 in its simplest form, is this : Statistics (extended by Induc 

 tion, and practically often gained by Deduction) inform us 

 that a certain event has happened, does happen, or will 

 happen, in a certain way in a certain proportion of cases, 

 We form a conception of that event, and regard it as possible - f 

 but we want to do more ; we want to know how much we 

 ought to expect it (under the explanations given in a for 

 mer chapter about quantity of belief). There is therefore a 

 sort of relative futurity about the event, inasmuch as our 

 knowledge of the fact, and therefore our justification or 

 otherwise of the correctness of our surmise, almost neces 

 sarily comes after the surmise was formed ; but the futurity 

 is only relative. The evidence by which the question is to 

 be settled may not be forthcoming yet, or we may have it by 



