SECT. 2.] Probability before and after the event. 279 



us but only consult it afterwards. It is from the fact of the 

 futurity being, as above described, only relative, that I have 

 preferred to speak of the conception of the event rather than 

 of the anticipation of it. The latter term, which in some re 

 spects would have seemed more intelligible and appropriate, 

 is open to the objection, that it does rather, in popular esti 

 mation, convey the notion of an absolute as opposed to a 

 relative futurity. 



2. For example ; a die is thrown. Once in six times 

 it gives ace ; if therefore we assume, without examination, 

 that the throw is ace, we shall be right once in six times. 

 In so doing we may, according to the usual plan, go forwards 

 in time ; that is, form our opinion about the throw before - 

 hand, when no one can tell what it will be. Or we might go 

 backwards; that is, form an opinion about dice that had 

 been cast on some occasion in time past, and then correct 

 our opinion by the testimony of some one who had been a 

 witness of the throws. In either case the mental operation 

 is precisely the same ; an opinion formed merely oh statisti 

 cal grounds is afterwards corrected by specific evidence. The 

 opinion may have been formed upon a past, present, or future 

 event ; the evidence which corrects it afterwards may be our 

 own eyesight, or the testimony of others, or any kind of in 

 ference ; by the evidence is merely meant such subsequent 

 examination of the case as is assumed to set the matter at 

 rest. It is quite possible, of course, that this specific evi 

 dence should never be forthcoming ; the conception in that 

 case remains as a conception, and never obtains that degree 

 of conviction which qualifies it to be regarded as a fact. 

 This is clearly the case with all past throws of dice the re 

 sults of which do not happen to have been recorded. 



In discussing games of chance there are obvious advan 

 tages in confining ourselves to what is really, as well as 



