SECT. 12.] Probability before and after the event. 289 



different (viz. we falling into the majority) we shall fail to 

 make him perceive that there is anything at all remarkable 

 in the event. 



It is not of course attempted in these remarks to justify 

 our surprise in every case in which it exists. Different 

 persons might be differently affected in the cases supposed, 

 and the examples are therefore given mainly for illustration. 

 Still on principles already discussed (Ch. vi. 32) we might 

 expect to find something like a general justification of the 

 amount of surprise. 



12. The answer commonly given in these cases is 

 confined to attempting to show that the surprise should not 

 arise, rather than to explaining how it does arise. It takes 

 the following form, You have no right to be surprised, for 

 nothing remarkable has really occurred. If this particular 

 thing had not happened something equally improbable 

 must. If the shot had not hit you or your friend, it must 

 have hit some one else who was a priori as unlikely to be 

 hit/ 



For one thing this answer does not explain the fact 

 that almost every one is surprised in such cases, and sur 

 prised somewhat in the different proportions mentioned 

 above. Moreover it has the inherent unsatisfactoriness 

 of admitting that something improbable has really hap 

 pened, but getting over the difficulty by saying that all the 

 other alternatives were equally improbable. A natural in 

 ference from this is that there is a class of things, in them 

 selves really improbable, which can yet be established upon 

 very slight evidence. Butler accepted this inference, and 

 worked it out to the strange conclusion given above. Mill 

 attempts to avoid it by the consideration of the very differ 

 ent values to be assigned to improbability before and after 

 the event. Some further discussion of this point will be 



v. 19 



