294 The Relativity of Probability. [CHAP. xn. 



justifiable, the common tables of mortality are all that any 

 one has to go by. 



17. It is true that in the case of a man s prospect of 

 death we should each qualify our judgment by what we 

 knew or reasonably supposed as to his health, habits, pro 

 fession, and so on, and should thus arrive at varying esti 

 mates. But no one could justify his own estimate without 

 appealing explicitly or implicitly to the statistical grounds on 

 which he had relied, and if these were not previously avail 

 able to other persons, he must now set them before their 

 notice. In other words, the judgments we entertain, here as 

 elsewhere, are only relative so long as we rest them on 

 grounds peculiar to ourselves. The process of justification, 

 which I consider to be essential to logic, has a tendency to 

 correct such individualities of judgment, and to set all ob 

 servers on the same basis as regards their data. 



It is better therefore to regard the conclusions of Proba 

 bility as being absolute and objective, in the same sense as, 

 though doubtless in a far less degree than, they are in Induc 

 tion. Fully admitting that our conclusions will in many 

 cases vary exceedingly from time to time by fresh accessions 

 of knowledge, it is preferable to regard such fluctuations of 

 assent as partaking of the nature of precipitate judgments, 

 founded on special statistics, instead of depending only on 

 those which are common to all observers. In calling such 

 judgments precipitate it is not implied that there is any 

 blame in entertaining them, but simply that, for one reason 

 or another, we have been induced to form them without 

 waiting for the possession of the full amount of evidence, 

 statistical or otherwise, which might ultimately be looked 

 for. This explanation will suit the facts equally well, and is 

 more consistent with the general philosophical position main 

 tained in this work. 



