312 Modality. [CHAP. xm. 



On the other hand, those who looked mainly at the form of 

 expression, would be led by the analogy of the four forms of 

 proposition, and the necessity that each of them should stand 

 in definite opposition to each other, to insist upon a distinc 

 tion between the four modals 1 . They, therefore, endeavoured 

 to introduce a distinction by maintaining (e.g. Crackanthorpe, 

 Bk. ill. ch. 11) that the contingent is that which now is but 

 may not be, and the possible that which now is not but may 

 be. A few appear to have made the distinction corre 

 spondent to that between the physically and the logically 

 possible. 



18. When we get to the Kantian division we have 

 reached much clearer ground. The meaning of each of these 

 terms is quite explicit, and it is also beyond doubt that they 

 have a more definite tendency in the direction of assigning a 

 graduated scale of conviction. So long as they are regarded 

 from a metaphysical rather than a logical standing point, 

 there is much to be said in their favour. If we use intro 

 spection merely, confining ourselves to a study of the judg 

 ments themselves, to the exclusion of the grounds on which 

 they rest, there certainly does seem a clear and well-marked 

 distinction between judgments which we cannot even con 

 ceive to be reversed in thought ; those which we could 

 reverse, but which we accept as true ; and those which we 

 merely entertain as possible. 



Regarded, however, as a logical division, Kant s arrange 

 ment seems to me of very little service. For such logical 

 purposes indeed, as we are now concerned with, it really 

 seems to resolve itself into a two-fold division. The dis 

 tinction between the apodeictic and the assert ory will be 



1 &quot;Hi quatuor modi magnam titateet qualitate varietate&quot; (Wallis s 

 censeri solent analogiam habere cum Instit. Logic. Bk. 11. ch. 8). 

 quadruplici proposition um in quan- 



