SECT., 25.] Fallacies. 357 



should be one. Amongst countless billions of times in which 

 you, and such as you, urge this, one person only will be 

 justified ; and it is not likely that you are that one, or that 

 this is that occasion. 



25. There is another form of this practical inability to 

 distinguish between one high number and another in the 

 estimation of chances, which deserves passing notice from its 

 importance in arguments about heredity. People will often 

 urge an objection to the doctrine that qualities, mental and 

 bodily, are transmitted from the parents to the offspring, on 

 the ground that there are a multitude of instances to the 

 contrary, in fact a great majority of such instances. To 

 raise this objection implies an utter want of appreciation of 

 the very great odds which possibly may exist, and which the 

 argument in support of heredity implies do exist against any 

 given person being distinguished for intellectual or other 

 eminence. This is doubtless partly a matter of definition, 

 depending upon the degree of rarity which we consider to be 

 implied by eminence ; but taking any reasonable sense of the 

 term, we shall readily see that a very great proportion of 

 failures may still leave an enormous preponderance of evi 

 dence in favour of the heredity doctrine. Take, for instance, 

 that degree of eminence which is implied by being one of 

 four thousand. This is a considerable distinction, though, 

 since there are about two thousand such persons to be found 

 amongst the total adult male population of Great Britain, it 

 is far from implying any conspicuous genius. Now suppose 

 that in examining the cases of a large number of the chil 

 dren of such persons, we had found that 199 out of 200 of 

 them failed to reach the same distinction. Many persons 

 would conclude that this was pretty conclusive evidence 

 against any hereditary transmission. To be able to adduce 

 only one favourable, as against 199 hostile instances, would 



