NO YUM ORGANUM. 



per divisibilibus, ex impotentia cogitationis. At inajore 

 cum pernicic intervenit h;ec impotentia mentis in in- 

 ventione causaruin : nain cum maxime universalia in 

 uatura positiva esse debeant, quemadmodum inveninn- 

 tur 58 , neque suut revera causabilia ; tainen intellectus 

 humanus, nescius acquiescere, adliuc appetit notiora. 

 Turn vero, ad ulteriora tendens, ad proximiora recidit, 

 videlicet ad causas finales, qua* sunt ]lane ex natura 

 hominis, jtotius (juani universi i&amp;gt;y : atque ex hoc fonte 

 philosophiam iniris modis corruperunt. Est auteni 

 sequc imperiti et leviter philosophantis, in maxime uni- 

 vcrsalibus eausam requirere, ac in subordinatis et sub- 

 alternis caiisun non desiderarc. 



XLIX. 



Intellectus humanus luminis sicci non est ; sed reei- 

 pit infusionem a voluntate ct alFectibus * ; id quod 



58 All tilings &quot; quemadmodum 

 invcniuntur,&quot; i. e. in tlu-ir real ex 

 istence, are positive. The &quot; Nega 

 tive&quot; refers to our method of ap 

 proximating to a conception of them. 

 &quot; The more universal, the more 

 positive.&quot; This may he : yet the 

 more universal things are, the more 

 we are driven to consider them hy 

 means of negatives. If taken strictly 

 this passage must refer to the Deity, 

 who alone is &quot; non-causabili&amp;lt;.&quot; Ma- 

 con, I think, means hy it the first 

 principles of Nature. And his mean 

 ing will he hest illustrated by a pas 

 sage from I). Stewart s Phil, of the 

 Human Mind, Introd. i. &quot; In the 

 investigation of Physical Laws it is 

 well known that our enquiries must 

 always terminate in some general 

 fact, of which no account can be 

 given but that such is the constitu 

 tion of Nature ;&quot; e. g. such as the 

 Law of Gravitation. 



M Final Causes depend on our 

 conceptions rather than on the Na 

 ture of Things ; on our arbitrary 

 suppositions as to the Intentions of 

 Nature. They are attacked again 

 Bk. II. 2: to which place the reader 

 is referred. 



60 Spinosa attacked this notion as 

 giving a wrong view of the origin 

 of evil. It is borrowed from the 

 Heraclitan avij ^t ^ij aptcrrr). He 

 connected the Moral and Phy 

 sical by it. Bacon refers to this 

 also in the Adv. of Learning, p. 12, 

 where he quotes Heraclitus by name. 

 He seems here to hold to the Ari 

 stotelian notion of the perfection of 

 the pure Intellect the avrfj 8td- 

 vota of Eth. vi. 2. But can one 

 affirm that, if free from Affections, 

 the Intellect would of itself discern 

 unerringly the True from the False. 

 Is there not an Intellectual as well 

 as a Moral dimness ? or does the 



