LIB. I. 63. 



auimse humanse, nobilissimse substantial, genus ex voci- 

 bus secundsc intentionis 96 tribuerit ; negotium densi et 

 rariy per quod corpora subeunt majores et minores 



end which Bacon followed, coiild at 

 any time like Aristotle ; at the time 

 when he lived we must make all 

 allowance for his dislike. Two cen 

 turies before, Roger Bacon, his most 

 wise forerunner, had written (MS. 

 Cotton. Tit. fol. 130. cap. 8) : &quot; Si 

 haberem potestatem super libros 

 Aristotelis, ego facerem omnia cre- 

 mari ; quia non est nisi temporis 

 amissio studere in illis, et caussa 

 erroris, et multiplicatio ignorantiae 

 ultra id quod valeat explicari.&quot; The 

 Schoolmen had by their &quot; thorny 

 disputations without fruit&quot; applied 

 the Aristotelian Logic, carried on by 

 Porphyry, to the neglect of all ap 

 peals to facts, of all real progress in 

 knowledge ; and until their whole 

 system was abolished there was no 

 hope. A system which settled the uni 

 verse deductively from &quot; ens,&quot; which 

 divided things into essence and at 

 tribute, which argued on things by 

 the Figures, must give way before 

 truth could emerge. These were in 

 deed later applications of Aristotelian 

 principles : but Bacon strikes at the 

 source, not at the results. And 

 even in Aristotle s own writings we 

 have more Logic than is necessary. 

 The Categories are an obstacle to 

 Truth ; and though we believe that 

 Aristotle meant his Logic to be in 

 itself strictly instrumental, still even 

 the ist Analytics are full of dogma 

 tic applications, and illustrations 

 drawn from arbitrary axioms. The 

 2nd Anal, are purposely a material 

 treatise, being the application of the 

 Syllogistic process to Necessary Mat 

 ter, and to the discovery of am at ; 

 and here as much as any where the 

 evil appears. And yet with it all 

 Aristotle was aware of the necessity 



of experiment and a certain Induc 

 tion. (See Anal. Post. i. 18.) Nor 

 do we think he should be so abso 

 lutely condemned as he is here. 

 Personally he was a careful observer 

 of facts, as well as both a subtle 

 and a deep thinker, and his Hist. 

 Animal, was, whatever Bacon may 

 say in its disparagement, a far more 

 striking work and far more truly an 

 appeal to Nature, than the hasty 

 and partial generalizations of the 

 older Philosophers had been . and 

 in his Moral and lesser treatises we 

 discern a judicious knowledge of 

 Human Nature, such as nothing 

 but personal experience could ever 

 have given. For a much fairer judg 

 ment on Aristotle see Herschel s 

 Discourse on Nat. Phil, part II. 

 ch. 3. 101 : see also D. Stewart, 

 Phil, of the Human Mind, part II. 

 chap. hi. sect. 3. 



There is a yet fiercer attack on 

 the ancient Philosophers in the &quot; Re- 

 suscitatio,&quot; under the title &quot; de Inter- 

 pretatione Naturae Sentential XII.&quot; 

 There he charges Aristotle with, i. 

 abominable sophistry, 2. useless 

 subtilty, and 3. a vile sporting with 

 words. 



96 From the vagueness which en 

 velopes &quot; voces secunda? intentio 

 nis&quot; it is hard to explain this great 

 injustice done to the Human Soul. 

 Bacon probably refers to the De 

 Anima II, i. 7 and n, where Ari 

 stotle lays it down that the soul is an 

 ovaia, and also eWf Ae ^eia ; meaning 

 probably by &quot; secundae intentionis 

 voces,&quot; Terms which are of technical 

 use in Philosophy. Whether this is 

 the right meaning of the Phrase is 

 not our question here. 



