LIB. I. 67. 



5 i 



intellectum deprimit, alter enervat. Nam Aristotelis 

 philosophia, postquam cseteras philosophias (more Otto- 



that in the world of Sense there can 

 be nothing certain, nothing known. 

 But Plato himself does not hold this 

 absolutely (though the Cave in the Re 

 public, Bk. vii. i, looks rather like 

 it), and it is a side view of his mind 

 which would lead us to class him 

 with the Sceptical Philosophers. 

 But, of course, extreme views on 

 neither side are fully developed by 

 the first teachers. Socrates with 

 his eipcoi/fia, his fj,i]8ev ywoxTKfiv, is 

 far more like a Sceptic ; though he 

 brought it in to overthrow his arro 

 gant antagonists, which was also his 

 object in holding so many negative 

 discussions. 



The Pyrrhonists take their name 

 from Pyrrho of Elis, who flourished 

 circ. B. C. 340. They are to be 

 distinguished from the New Aca 

 demy; for they doubted, without 

 either affirming or denying : so in 

 Cic. Tusc. Qusest. i. &quot; Chius Metro- 



dorus. . . . Nego, inquit, scire nos, 

 sciamusne aliquid, an nihil scia- 

 mus; ne id ipsum quidem nescire 

 aut scire, scire nos; nee omnino sit- 

 ne aliquid, an nihil sit.&quot; Entire 

 suspension of judgment (eVo^) is 

 the mental condition of the true 

 Sceptic a condition affirmed to be 

 one of perfect happiness; and per 

 haps, remembering how men suc 

 ceed in retaining this eVo^r) through 

 life, and seem to cherish such a 

 mental indecision, there may be 

 something in the view. But the 

 Sceptics did not go so far as the 

 New Academy, who &quot; Acatalepsiam 

 dogmatizaverunt, etex professo tenu- 

 erunt,&quot;&quot;affirming&quot;(as SirT. Browne 

 in the Rel. Med. i. 55. says) &quot; they 

 knew nothing, and even in that 

 opinion confuting themselves, and 

 thinking that they knew more than 

 all the world besides :&quot; and so Lu 

 cretius (iv. 471) writes of them, 



: Nihil scire si quis putat, id quoque nescit 

 An sciri possit ; quoniam nil scire fatetur.&quot; 



Dugald Stewart opposes Credulity 

 to Scepticism, rather regarding op- 

 posites in the Human Mind than 

 Schools of Philosophy. Bacon s 

 chief distinction here is between 

 those who admitted no doubts, and 

 those who confounded all by declar 

 ing all things doubtful: while he 

 afterwards distinguishes between 

 these (the Sceptics) and the New 

 Academy, who declared that though 

 nothing could be possibly known as 

 certain, yet many things might be 

 pursued as probable : and so escaped 

 the practical absurdities arising from 

 Pyrrhonism. 



Pascal disposes of both extremes 

 in very few words, &quot; La Nature con- 

 fond les Pyrrhoniens, et la Raison 



les Dogmatistes&quot; (see his Pensees, 

 Art. viii. i, where the whole matter 

 is well discussed) ; or as Hume (in 

 his Essays) says, &quot; The great sub- 

 verter of Pyrrhonism is Action and 

 Employment, and the occupations 

 of common life.&quot; Dugald Stewart 

 also points out the fact that doubt 

 may be as much the fashion as dog 

 matism: and as Rousseau says, &quot; He 

 who at the end of the i8th century 

 has brought himself to abandon all 

 his early principles without discri 

 mination, would probably have been 

 a Bigot in the days of the League.&quot; 

 See Diog. Laert. vit. Pyrrhon., 

 and vit. Anaxarch. ; also Dr. Jere- 

 mie s Essay on Sextus Empiricus 

 and the Sceptics, Encycl. Metrop. ; 



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