134 



NOVUM ORGANUM. 



II. 



Quaiii infeliciter se habeat scientia humana, qurc in 

 iisu est, etiam ex illis liquet, qtur vnlgo assenintur. 

 Recte ponitiir; Vere scirc, csse per causas xcire . Etiam 



7 Eiria-Taadai oli&amp;gt;p.(6a urav TTJV 

 T alriav aiup.(6a -yivaxjKfiv, 81 fjv TO 

 IT pay pa ((TTIV, on (Kfivov alria ttrn. 

 Arist. Anal. Post. I. ii. These are 

 the four Aristotelian &amp;lt;!px a ( T ) tne 

 Material, 17 uAr; or TO vnoKfiptvov. 

 (2) The Formal, TO ri rjv fivai: (3) 

 The Efficient, 19 dpx 1 ? ^ fv *1 K ^ 1 1 (TLS 

 (4) The, Final, TO nv (vcxa. Cf. Ar. 

 Metaph. II. 2. For what is really 

 meant by &quot; cause&quot; and &quot; effect,&quot; 

 and for the ignorance of Man as to 

 the real nature of Antecedents and 

 of their connection with their Con 

 sequents, see 1). Stewart s Philoso 

 phy of the Human Mind, chap. i. 

 2, and note C on the same place. 



Of these four causes, Bacon con 

 siders that three are legitimate ob 

 jects for study and for discovery 

 of Truth ; the fourth he regards as 

 harmful. By the Material cause is 

 meant the Material Elements or 

 particles of which a body is com 

 posed. Investigation into this will 

 be that of the Chemists when they 

 seek for simple substances. The For 

 mal cause is the principle or power, 

 whatever it is, which makes each 

 thing that is generated in the world 

 keep within its own limits as, e. g. 

 it would be the &quot; Form&quot; that 

 obliges a grain of wheat to expand 

 into the stalk and ear of &quot;Wheat, and 

 not of Barley. By the Efficient 

 cause we usually mean all the lower 

 motive causes (the will of God and 

 the Formal Causes being regarded 

 as the higher motives) thus the 

 hand of the sower, the soil, the 

 dews, &c. would be efficient Causes 

 of the growth of the grain of wheat. 

 And the Final Cause is the same 



with the end for which a thing ex 

 ists. So multiplication of grain for 

 the service and sustenance of man 

 would be the final cause of Wheat. 

 This last Cause is clearly subjective, 

 and depends upon our conception of 

 things, rather than on the nature of 

 things themselves. It is in fact our 

 notion of the Intentions of Nature 

 &quot; plane ex natura hominis, potius 

 quam universi.&quot; (I. 48.) And it 

 seems clear that in general the study 

 of Final Causes would tend to da 

 mage our search after Truth. To 

 know the actual nature of a thing, 

 we must investigate it in and for 

 itself, not for its results. For in 

 stance, we should never know the 

 nature of Air, by contemplating the 

 fact that it supports life. At the 

 same time these Final Causes are 

 facts in the constitution of Nature; 

 and if fairly treated, may lead to 

 much knowledge. And we find in 

 the Adv. of Learning (p. 143 146) 

 some very just observations on Final 

 Causes, which throw great light on 

 this condemnation of them. Bacon 

 there attacks them solely when re 

 garded as parts of Physics, and al 

 lows that they may well be inquired 

 and collected in &quot; Metaphysique ;&quot; 

 and so, though he considered the 

 Atheistical Philosophy of Democri- 

 tus more sound for Physical investi 

 gation than the mixed Philosophies 

 of Aristotle and Plato, yet he takes 

 great care to acknowledge the truth 

 and worth of Final Causes, and to 

 protest against its being alleged (as 

 it was doubtless then, and has been 

 since,) that by reducing them to 

 their proper position, he was &quot; call- 



