LIB. II. 2. 



135 



non male constituuntur causa? quatuor ; materia, forma, 

 efficiens, et finis. At ex his causa finalis tantum abest 

 ut prosit, ut etiam scieritias corrumpat, nisi in hominis 

 actionibus. Forma? inventio habetur pro desperata. 

 Efficiens vero, et materia (quales quseruntur et recipi- 

 untur, remotae scilicet, absque latenti processu ad for- 

 mam) res perfunctorise sunt, et superficiales, et nihili 

 fere ad scientiam veram et activam. Neque tamen 

 obliti sumus, nos superius 8 notasse et correxisse erro- 

 rem mentis humanse, in deferendo formis primas esseri- 

 tia?. Licet enim in natura 9 nihil vere existat praster 



ing in question or derogating from 

 Divine Providence.&quot; He was rather 

 &quot; highly confirming and exalting it.&quot; 

 To say that Final Causes will not 

 teach us the actual constitution of 

 things, cannot be regarded as in 

 any sense an attack on the &quot; Argu 

 ment from Design,&quot; on which wri 

 ters on &quot; the Religion of Nature&quot; 

 base so much. Having thus vindi 

 cated Bacon from the grave charge 

 of altogether ejecting Final Causes, 

 and of favouring Atheism, it only 

 remains to be seen whether he is 

 right in condemning their connec 

 tion with Physical Investigation. 

 Here, I believe, the actual progress 

 of Science would have led him to 

 modify his judgment. &quot; It must be 

 allowed that apart from the charm 

 which the Final Causes, or ends of 

 things, lend to Nature, when they 

 are satisfactorily perceived, (which 

 is the moral use of them), there are 

 some cases in which a consideration 

 of them has conduced to actual dis 

 coveries in science.&quot; So in the 

 famous case of Harvey s discovery 

 of the circulation of the blood from 

 the consideration of the Final 

 Causes of the valves in the veins of 

 the animal body. This modification 



of Bacon s view is connected, how 

 ever, with that lower view of the 

 end and aim of Physical Science, 

 which we are led to take, in conse 

 quence of the actual progress of 

 Knowledge, and of our abandoning 

 the search after Form. We are con 

 tent to affirm Ovdev p.drr]v Trotet fj 

 (pva-Ls and to use Nature s desire 

 of an end, as a means for the dis 

 covery of Truth just as the Moral 

 Philosophers may fairly do with 

 Moral Truths. For discussion on 

 this point, see Hallam s Lit. of Eu 

 rope, part III. chap. iii. 51. and 

 D. Stewart s Phil, of the Human 

 Mind, part II. ch. iv. vi. i. where 

 the subject is very judiciously treat 

 ed. And for the whole subject of 

 the Knowledge of Causes, see D. 

 Stewart, part II. ch. iv. i. 



8 &quot; Superius,&quot; i. e. 1. 51, 65. Can 

 the reading &quot; formis primas essen- 

 tiag&quot; be correct ? Bacon refers to 

 Platonic Ideas. 



9 &quot; In natura,&quot; i. e. in the world 

 outside Man the Material World. 

 Otherwise what would become of 

 thought, sensation, &c. ? This is 

 one of the passages which seem at 

 first sight to favour the Materialist 

 School. But it does not ; for Bacon 



