LIB. 11. 8, 9 . 147 



nern aut fractiones nemo reformidet. In rebus enini, 

 qurc per numeros transiguntur, tani facile quis posuerit 

 aut cogitaverit millenarium, quam unum ; aut millesi- 

 mam partem unius, quam unum integrum. 



IX. 



Ex duobus generibus axiomatum, quse superius posita 

 sunt, oritur vera divisio philosophise, et scieiitiarum ; 

 translatis vocabulis receptis (qua? ad indicationem rei 

 proxime accedunt) ad scnsuui nostrum. Videlicet, ut 

 inquisitio formarum, qiuu sunt (ratione certe, et sua 

 lege) asteriue et immobiles, constituat metaphysicam 2:} ; 

 inquisitio vero effidentis, et material, et latentis proces- 

 sus, et latentis schematismi, (qua; omnia cursum naturae 

 communem et ordinarium, non leges fundamentales et 



23 Cf. De Augm. Sclent. III. ch. 

 iv. -vi. Adv. of Learning, p. 135 

 142. There he includes the inves 

 tigation of Final Causes under Me 

 taphysics. Here he abandons these, 

 and seems to limit it to the disco 

 very of Form. This is, as he says, 

 &quot; using the word Metapkysique in a 

 different sense from that that is re 

 ceived.&quot; (For Bacon prefers, &quot; per- 

 purgato nomine,&quot; to retain old terms 

 with new meanings, before coining 

 new Terms as Aristotle did. It is 

 a choice of evils : but modern science 

 inclines to the use of new nomen 

 clatures.) He places his Metaphysi- 

 que next the Vertical point of know 

 ledge i. e. next the &quot; Opus (mod 

 operatur deus a principle usque ad 

 finern&quot; the summary law of Na 

 ture, as to which he doubts whether 

 man can ever attain to it. Modern 

 Philosophy has not ratified Bacon s 

 use of the Term ; for it has ruled the 

 discovery of &quot; causae causantes&quot; to 

 be impossible ; and so considers his 

 Metaphysique as useless. The word, 

 however, is still in constant use. 



The Ancients meant by it the con 

 templation of the absolute un 

 changeable causes of things (TOV 

 OVTOS, j) ov.) Modern writers use it 

 somewhat vaguely. Perhaps in its 

 widest usage it may even include 

 Mathematics, as well as its more 

 proper subjects, viz. speculations 

 as to Time and Space, entity and 

 non-entity, &c. and all the phe 

 nomena of Psychology. In this 

 broad sense the Term will, in fact, 

 include all truths except those im 

 mediately dependent on the senses, 

 those taught us by God s Revela 

 tion, and those handed down by 

 historic record. But, ordinarily, Ma 

 thematics are marked off, because 

 of their vast and distinct import 

 ance. 



Physics will be the investigation 

 of all truths of sensible apprecia 

 tion, with a view to the discovery of 

 their general Laws. So Newton s 

 Principia would be physical : and 

 so would the Mixed Mathematics 

 generally be. Cf. Mill s Logic, I. 

 viii. 



L 2 



