APPENDIX B. 



distinction, in tact, &quot; ars instrumentalis dirigens mentem in 

 cognitione, (not in cognitionern) rernm.&quot; Before considering 

 tins position, it will be as well to state, that whatever view we 

 may take of Syllogism, as a Method, or even as an Instrument, 

 we do not for one moment doubt its usefulness as a means of 

 education ; for it sharpens and clears the Intellect, and gives to 

 young men greater power of attention, and of analysis of the 

 thoughts of others ; and so is most fitly retained in a system 

 of education, which regards not the amount of information to 

 be acquired, so much as the mental power to be brought into 

 play or improved. 



Is then the Svllojjism a sufficient Instrument for the guid- 



v c5 



ance of the Human Mind in the discovery of Truth? This is 

 the question which Bacon asked, and answered in the negative. 

 In other words, can man by application of Syllogism to his 

 otherwise unaided reason and senses arrive unerringly, or even 

 proximately, at the truth ? Does the Method reject error, and 

 strengthen truth ? is it a self-regulating machine in any de 

 gree ? For unless it be all this, it must be regarded as insuffi 

 cient for the purposes we have in view. It is, indeed, a clear 

 analysis of certain &quot; Laws of Thought.&quot; of certain functions of 

 the mind of Man, and no one ought to wish to take from Ari 

 stotle the credit due to him for his acuteness in detecting the 

 processes of reasoning ; althougl i opinions may differ as to his 

 manner of treating his subject, his obscure method of illustra 

 tion, and his division of the application of Syllogism to &quot; De 

 monstrative 1 and &quot; Contingent&quot; (or &quot; Topical&quot;) Matter. 



The Syllogistic process is based upon one Axiom only, and 

 that Axiom upon the relations between Whole and Part. (For 

 we pass by all distinctions between Predication of Inhesion or 

 of Extension ; and regard the matter, as it should be taken, 

 absolutely.) &quot; Whatever can be predicated of a Whole can be 

 predicated of all parts included under that Whole ; whatever 

 cannot be predicated of the Whole cannot be predicated of the 

 parts.&quot; Let us allow this to be as simple as it looks ; let us 

 allow too that it will be directly acknowledged as a prime law. 

 holding in Logic as in everything else. What then remains 

 for us to do ? to apply the rule to things. We may indeed 



