90 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON. 



Hardy, as well as Mr. Mill, who spoke on the other 

 side of the general question, said that the charge was 

 &quot; not law,&quot; and was &quot; without legal authority.&quot; Mr. 

 Finlason, a most competent authority, said that, &quot; al 

 though, the charge dealt so largely in denunciation,&quot; 

 it was &quot; utterly indeterminate and indecisive ;&quot; that 

 &quot; it avowed a state of entire doubt ;&quot; that, though 

 &quot; there was much denunciation of law laid down [by 

 others], there was no positive declaration of law laid 

 down by the Chief Justice.&quot; The same writer also 

 points out grave mistakes of history as well as errors 

 of law in this charge. Thus, the Chief Justice as 

 sumes, as a cardinal thought, that martial law and 

 military law are one and the same thing: a mistake, 

 which implies extraordinary confusion of mind , for- 

 getfulness of his own official opinions in the inci 

 dents of the rebellion in Ceylon, and ignorance of 

 the most commonplace events of English history, for 

 instance, as detailed in Hallain and Macaulay, 



I allude to these criticisms for the reason that, as 

 will appear in the sequel, the same singular intellect 

 ual traits and moral characteristics of the Chief Jus- 

 tice, which became conspicuous at Geneva, had shown 

 themselves on the Queen s Bench, and had attracted 

 the notice of his fellow-countrymen. 



I refer to this charge for another cause. It is diffi 

 cult for many reasons to measure the exact personal 

 value of ordinary legal opinions delivered, in the 

 course of adjudication, by any judge of the Queen s 

 Bench. All such difficulties cease when he goes out 

 of his way to deliver a demonstrative charge to a 



