ALABAMA CLAIMS. 133 



ed &quot;advocate,&quot; making no pretensions to &quot;fairness&quot; or 

 &quot;impartiality,&quot; but, with the &quot;premises,&quot; &quot;bias,&quot; &quot;log 

 ic,&quot; and &quot;facts&quot; of such an advocate, drawing up a 

 passionate, rhetorical plea, as the officious &quot; represent 

 ative of Great Britain.&quot; 



As such &quot;representative of Great Britain,&quot; if he be 

 not promptly disavowed by the British Government, 

 it will be found that his &quot;Reasons&quot; lay down many 

 positions which may somewhat embarrass present or 

 subsequent Ministers. 



The Neius notices numerous contradictory opinions 

 or conclusions which appear in the &quot;Reasons.&quot; In 

 one place Sir Alexander complains that any Rules are 

 laid down by the Treaty, and in another place ex 

 presses the conviction that it is well to settle such 

 questions by Treaty Rules. &quot; He complains . . . that 

 the Arbitrators have not been left free to apply the 

 hitherto received principles of international law, and 

 that they have; that rules have been laid down, 

 and that they have not ; that definitions have been 

 framed, and that they have not been framed.&quot; Here 

 is most exquisite confusion of ideas. It is the very 

 same extraordinary and characteristic method of 

 thinking and writing which Mr. Finlason had ex- 



o o 



hibited at length, and which Mr. Gathorne Hardy 

 pointed out in the case of the Queen against Xor- 

 ton: the &quot;inflammatory statements,&quot; the &quot;extra-ju 

 dicial denunciation,&quot; the &quot;extra-judicial declamation,&quot; 

 the going &quot;from one side to another,&quot; and the say 

 ing &quot; it is &quot; and &quot; it is not &quot; upon every point of law. 

 The perfect similitude of these repulsive features of 



