144 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON. 



out pausing to consider whether these observations 

 are perfectly accurate or not as a definition of the law 

 of nations, we may assume that they are substantially 

 so, and suffice at any rate to show clearly the uncan- 

 did spirit of Sir Alexander s criticism of the imputed 

 language of Mr. Stsempfli, a criticism which calls to 

 mind a similar unjust and vicious reproach cast by 

 Junius on Lord Mansfield. 



The actual statement of Mr. Staempfli, as we have 

 seen, was unexceptionably accurate and precise, in so 

 far as regarded the matters before the Tribunal. 



Meanwhile, Mr. Staempfli may have said orally, what 

 he says here in print, that in many supposable cases 

 of deficient explicitness either of the conventional 

 rules or of the historic law of nations, &quot; c est au Tri 

 bunal d y supple er en interpretant et appliquant les 

 trois regies de son mieux et en toute conscience.&quot; 



That is what the Viscount of Itajuba says in one 

 of his opinions, namely, that a certain doctrine, assert 

 ed by the British Government, &quot; froisse la conscience.&quot; 

 It is what Count Sclopis intends, when he says, &quot; Les 

 nations ont entre elles un droit commun, ou, si on aime 

 mieux, un lien commun, forme par Vequite et sanc- 

 tionne par le respect des interets reciprocities; 1 and 

 that such is the spirit of the Treaty of Washington, 

 &quot; qiri ne fait que donner la preference aux regies de 

 requite generale sur les dispositions d une legislation 

 particuliere quelle qu elle puisse etre.&quot; That is &quot; the 

 universal immutable justice,&quot; which in all systems of 

 law, international or national, distinguishes right from 

 wrong, and to which the United States appealed in 



