AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS 



ply the demand for farmers when the six grades 

 of land are in use, and as he cannot pay any rent 

 for its use it is fair to assume that no other farmer 

 will pay anything for its use. All of the farmers 

 who possess a higher degree of qualitative effi- 

 ciency than the F grade farmer are in a position 

 to pay more for the more productive grades of 

 land than the F grade farmer can possibly pay, 

 and still secure a larger net return on their invest- 

 ments than they can make on marginal or F 

 grade land when the latter is rent-free. It be- 

 comes evident, therefore, that the F grade farmer 

 will, under keen competition, be confined to the 

 6th grade land and that in a competition for the 

 other grades of land he is not able to bid high 

 enough to make it desirable for any of the more 

 efficient farmers to prefer the 6th grade land. 



But the question before us is, how much rent 

 will the competition among the farmers of the 

 various grades of farmers induce them to pay 

 for the various grades of land? Under the hy- 

 pothesis that the F grade farmer and the 6th grade 

 land are both needed to supply the demand at a 

 given time and with a given price level, competi- 

 tion will leave a minimum return of five dollars 

 to the F grade farmer when he confines his atten- 

 tion to the 6th grade land and no rent will be paid 

 for the 6th grade land. The E grade farmer is 

 able to secure a return of six dollars on the mar- 

 ginal land. It cannot be expected, therefore, that 



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