AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS 



seems to be no good reason why the tenant should 

 not do as he likes. The principle being estab- 

 lished that the landlord has a right to direct more 

 or less definitely the operations of the farm, as 

 in the case o'f share tenancy, the landlord has little 

 difficulty in so directing the management of the 

 farm as to preserve the fertility of the land. The 

 choice of crops, and the organization of the field- 

 system are subjects which the share tenant is usu- 

 ally willing to leave to the landlord, and in many 

 cases the landlord controls the field operations in 

 the minutest detail. For example, the depth to 

 which land is to be plowed, the time of sowing, 

 planting, harvesting, etc. ; the number of times a 

 field of Indian corn should be cultivated, etc., are 

 details to which the landlord often gives his atten- 

 tion under this system of letting land. The land- 

 lord is willing to exert himself for these purposes 

 because his profits are increased by such activity. 

 Another reason often given by landlords for 

 preferring a share of the crop to a cash rent, is 

 that, in a country where most of the tenants have 

 little wealth, a share of the product proves more 

 profitable to the landlord, in the long run, because 

 he shares the benefit of an extra large crop and 

 gets something out of the smallest one, whereas in 

 case he is receiving a fixed rent, the tenant gets 

 all the advantage of an extra large crop, but in 

 case of a crop failure the tenant is often unable 

 to pay the fixed rent and the landlord has to stand 

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