15 



to bridge the interval, or be conducive to the pros- 

 perity and happiness of the people ; but on the con- 

 trary, I consider that the adoption of such a course 

 will be productive of the very opposite results. 



For, let us suppose some of theStates of Rajpoot- 

 anah, in the centre of which lies the little British 

 possession of Ajmeer, to be visited by a severe fa- 

 mine. As is the custom in like cases, the corn mer- 

 chants would, of course, buy up all the grain in 

 Ajmeer, and sell it in the dearest market within 

 reach. Now according* to the Common Law, as 

 much grain as was displaced by the purchases of 

 the corn speculators, should, for the same cause that 

 led to its displacement, pour into Ajmeer from other 

 neighbouring sources, and the equilibrium of prices 

 throughout the country be maintained. But, un- 

 fortunately, there is no Zollverein in Rajpootanah. 

 The native chiefs whose territories, on all sides, hem 

 in our little State, being non-principle men, not a 

 stone of corn would be allowed to pass their fron- 

 tiers. Consequently, in the prosperous native States, 

 the price of grain would never rise at all, while 

 British subjects would have to purchase it at famine 

 prices, a privilege which, could they understand 

 that they were the martyrs of 4 sound principles of 

 trade/ they might, perhaps, appreciate ; but being 

 very simple, and very poor people, entirely ignorant 

 of the many and hard fought pitch-battles that have 

 been fought on the floor of the British House of 

 Commons, between Free Traders and Protectionists, 



