138 THE LAW AFFECTING ENGINEEKS 



soon as possible." It was held that by these words the defen- 

 dants must be taken to have meant that they would make the 

 " gun " as quickly as it could be made in the largest establish- 

 ment with the best appliances. "I do not think," said Cotton, 

 L. J., " that these words can be taken to mean that the defen- 

 dants merely promised to make the machine as quickly as the 

 means at their disposal might allow, however rashly they 

 might have entered into the contract ; such a stipulation 

 would be unusual." (As to the meaning of " immediately," 

 see Chap. VI., 34.) 



If work is to be completed within so many days " from " a 

 particular date, there is no general rule that the day is to be 

 included or excluded (Lester v. Garland, 1808, 15 Ves. 248, and 

 see South Stafford Tram Co. v. Sickness and Accident Assurance 

 Co., 1891, 1 Q. B. 402) ; and in view of the uncertainty which 

 may arise on this head it is always wise to specify the exact 

 day on which the work is to be completed. Where the term 

 " month " is used, it means lunar month, unless the context 

 shows or it is otherwise proved that calendar month was 

 intended (Simpson v. Margitson, 1847, 11 Q. B. 23). 



3. Simple form of time-clause. The following is a simple 

 form of time-clause: "The contractor shall commence the 

 works immediately and shall proceed with the works to the 

 satisfaction of the engineer, and shall complete and deliver 

 the same over to the employer as entire works by or before 

 the [naming a day certain'] , unless the engineer shall fix or 

 substitute in writing another date for the completion of the 

 contract, in which case the substituted date shall be the date 

 for completion as though the same had originally been inserted 

 in the contract." This simple form makes no provision for 

 delay caused by the ordering of extras, strikes, inevitable 

 accident, " the act of God," etc. Many contractors will insist 

 upon the insertion of clauses relieving them from responsibility 

 in such cases. 



4. Where the contract does not prescribe a particular time. 

 Whenever a party to a contract undertakes to do a particular 

 act the performance of which depends entirely on himself, so 

 that he may choose his own mode of fulfilling his undertaking, 

 and the contract is silent as to time, the law implies a contract 

 to do it within a reasonable time (Ford v. Cotesworth, 1868, 



