156 THE LAW AFFECTING ENGINEEES 



which the engineer stated his view to be that the contract 

 bound the contractor to use stone, and that it was not an 

 extra. The company then referred the dispute to the arbitra- 

 tion of the engineer. After this reference, and on the day 

 for which the first appointment had been made, the engineer 

 wrote to the contractor a letter, in which he repeated his 

 former view. The plaintiff brought his action to restrain 

 the company from proceeding further with the arbitration. 

 It was held that, considering the position of the engineer, 

 who, as engineer of the company, must necessarily have 

 expressed an opinion on the point in dispute, his writing, 

 after the commencement of the arbitration, a letter repeating 

 the same opinion would not disqualify him from acting as 

 arbitrator, unless on the fair construction of the letter it 

 appeared that he had made up his mind so as not to be open 

 to change it on argument. 



In Cross v. Leeds Corporation, 1902, 2 H. B. C. 369, an 

 arbitrator, who was an official of the Leeds Corporation, 

 wrote a letter in which he said that the claim of the con- 

 tractors against the corporation was outrageous. The con- 

 tractors brought an action against the corporation, which the 

 corporation applied to have stayed pending the arbitration ; 

 the contractors opposed this. It was held that the arbitrator 

 was not disqualified. 



The following passage from the judgment of Lord Collins 

 (then Master of the Rolls) is not unimportant. Dealing 

 generally with the position of an engineer or architect, he 

 said : " The parties have not agreed that is the plain English 

 of it for an impartial arbitrator, because the person they 

 have agreed upon as arbitrator is one who, it may be pre- 

 supposed, may have formed, to the best of his ability, and 

 with all the information that was at hand, an adverse opinion 

 to one of the parties upon the points in dispute." 



The mere fact that an engineer holds shares in the company 

 which is employing a contractor does not affect his position 

 or expose him to a charge of partiality (Ranger v. Great 

 Western Raihvay, 1854, 5 H. L. C. 72). 



Where, however, there is some agreement between the 

 engineer and the employer which is likely to prejudice the 

 contractor, the contractor is entitled to know of it. (As to 

 bias on the part of an arbitrator, see Chap. XX., 14, 35, 

 post.) 



