AEBITEATIONS AND AWARDS 217 



20. Power and duty of taxing officer as to fees. - Sometimes 

 a taxing officer is called upon to decide, under s. 15 (3) of the 

 Arbitration Act, 1889, as to the fees of an arbitrator. It has 

 been decided that upon such a taxation the taxing officer is 

 not entitled, if the evidence all goes to show that in the 

 opinion of persons in the same profession the charges made 

 by the arbitrator are for a person in his position fair, to dis- 

 regard that evidence and to reduce the remuneration to such 

 an amount as is in his opinion fair (Mason, Ltd. v. Lovatt, 

 1907, 23 T. L. E. 486). 



In that case a quantity surveyor had acted as arbitrator in 

 a dispute between a firm of plumbers and a builder. The 

 reference lasted for twenty-two days, and the arbitrator was 

 subsequently employed for thirteen days in considering the 

 case. He also took the advice of solicitor and counsel on 

 certain points of law. He charged 527 10s., which included 

 ten guineas a day for thirty-five days, and 110 6s. for fees 

 paid for legal advice. The district registrar, disregarding the 

 evidence of surveyors in good position, held that five guineas 

 a day was sufficient, and reduced the above amount by 

 283 Os. Qd. The Court of Appeal set this judgment aside. 

 Dealing with the surveyor's remuneration, Lord Justice 

 Moulton said : " The evidence is all one way that the price 

 charged by him was fair for a person belonging to his pro- 

 fession and occupying the position which he occupied in that 

 profession. The district registrar was not entitled to set that 

 evidence aside. The true standard, in my opinion, of what 

 should be paid in such a case is what a fair-minded man in 

 the position of the referee would have required if a bargain 

 had been freely made beforehand. In this case there is no 

 ground for supposing the referee has charged more than 

 would have been required by a fair-minded man in a free 

 bargain." (See also 23, infra.) 



21. Duty to specify items. The duty of an arbitrator to 

 specify the items in his bill was clearly laid down in Gilbert 

 v. Wright, 20 T. L. E. 164. In that case there was a motion 

 to set aside an award on the ground that it was bad, inasmuch 

 as the costs of the umpire and arbitrators were unreasonable 

 and excessive, and ought to be referred by the Court for 

 taxation. The portion of the award complained of on this 

 ground was: "I further award, adjudge, and settle the 



