THE ARBITER OF ETHICS 239 



attempted also to find the causes of evolution and the 

 mechanism of heredity. And here all is confusion, 

 and, as occurred in the physical sciences, each theorist 

 sets up his own scheme of natural selection, of pan- 

 genesis, of mutation and what not, and the battle 

 without an issue rages fiercely. In the first place, a 

 purely anthropomorphic aspect is given to evolution by 

 the unjustifiable use of the terms higher and lower 

 forms of life. These words can signify merely the 

 comparison between two types as regards their com- 

 plexity of functions. It is only by regarding man as 

 the goal toward which all creation tends, that we can 

 call those types the highest which most nearly resemble 

 man. The final step is easy and the word " high " in 

 evolution is transferred to the derived sense of mean- 

 ing noble and good. It would be a most interesting and 

 useful work to trace back this curious and persistent 

 habit of linking high and low as space attributes, to 

 high and low as ethical concepts. Much of our con- 

 fusion of thought comes from such loose use of words, 

 and few of us can quite rid our minds of the impression 

 that hell and evil are beneath us, and heaven and joy 

 above us. At all events, the metaphorical use of these 

 words seems to have done much to change the imper- 

 sonal law of evolution into a sort of deity which de- 

 velops the lowly algae into a choir of angels. 



If we attempt to discover, in a general way, the 

 cause of evolution, we must ascribe it either to a super- 



