MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 13 



arbiter of metaphysical truth. But in fact the opposi 

 tion of instinct and reason is mainly illusory. Instinct, 

 intuition, or insight is what first leads to the beliefs 

 tfhich subsequent reason confirms or confutes ; but the 

 Confirmation, where it is possible, consists, in the last 

 analysis, of agreement with other beliefs no less in 

 stinctive. Reason is a harmonising, controlling force 

 rather than a creative one. Even in the most purely 

 logical realm, it is insight that first arrives at what is 

 new. 



Where instinct and reason do sometimes conflict is in 

 regard to single beliefs, held instinctively, and held with 

 such determination that no degree of inconsistency with 

 other beliefs leads to their abandonment. Instinct, like 

 all human faculties, is liable to error. Those in whom 

 reason is weak are often unwilling to admit this as 

 regards themselves, though all admit it in regard to 

 others. Where instinct is least liable to error is in 

 practical matters as to which right judgment is a help to 

 survival : friendship and hostility in others, for instance, 

 are often felt with extraordinary discrimination through 

 very careful disguises. But even in such matters a wrong 

 impression may be given by reserve or flattery ; and in 

 matters less directly practical, such as philosophy deals 

 with, very strong instinctive beliefs are sometimes wholly 

 mistaken, as we may come to know through their per 

 ceived inconsistency with other equally strong beliefs. 

 It is such considerations that necessitate the harmonising 

 mediation of reason, which tests our beliefs by their 

 mutual compatibility, and examines, in doubtful cases, 

 the possible sources of error on the one side and on the 

 other. In this there is no opposition to instinct as a 

 whole, but only to blind reliance upon some one interest 

 ing aspect of instinct to the exclusion of other more 



