MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 17 



and new at every moment, is certainly true ; it is also true 

 that this cannot be fully expressed by means of intel 

 lectual concepts. Only direct acquaintance can give 

 knowledge of what is unique and new. But direct ac 

 quaintance of this kind is given fully in sensation, and 

 does not require, so far as I can see, any special faculty 

 of intuition for its apprehension. It is neither intellect 

 nor intuition, but sensation, that supplies new data ; 

 but when the data are new in any remarkable manner, 

 intellect is much more capable of dealing with them than 

 intuition would be. The hen with a brood of ducklings 

 no doubt has intuition which seems to place her inside 

 them, and not merely to know them analytically ; but 

 when the ducklings take to the water, the whole apparent 

 intuition is seen to be illusory, and the hen is left helpless 

 on the shore. Intuition, in fact, is an aspect and develop 

 ment of instinct, and, like all instinct, is admirable in 

 those customary surroundings which have moulded the 

 habits of the animal in question, but totally incompetent 

 as soon as the surroundings are changed in a way which 

 demands some non-habitual mode of action. 



The theoretical understanding of the world, which is 

 the aim of philosophy, is not a matter of great practical 

 importance to animals, or to savages, or even to most 

 civilised men. It is hardly to be supposed, therefore, 

 that the rapid, rough and ready methods of instinct or 

 intuition will find in this field a favourable ground for 

 their application. It is the older kinds of activity, which 

 bring out our kinship with remote generations of animal 

 and semi-human ancestors, that show intuition at its 

 best. In such matters as self-preservation and love, 

 intuition will act sometimes (though not always) with a 

 swiftness and precision which are astonishing to the 

 critical intellect. But philosophy is not one of the 



