MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 29 



we are no longer in verbal agreement with most of the 

 great philosophers and religious teachers of the past. I 

 believe, however, that the elimination of ethical con 

 siderations from philosophy is both scientifically necessary 

 and though this may seem a paradox an ethical 

 advance. Both these contentions must be briefly 

 defended. 



The hope of satisfaction to our more human desires 

 the hope of demonstrating that the world has this or that 

 desirable ethical characteristic is not one which, so far 

 as I can see, a scientific philosophy can do anything 

 whatever to satisfy. The difference between a good world 

 and a bad one is a difference in the particular character 

 istics of the particular things that exist in these worlds : 

 it is not a sufficiently abstract difference to come within 

 the province of philosophy. Love and hate, for example, 

 are ethical opposites, but to philosophy they are closely 

 analogous attitudes towards objects. The general form 

 and structure of those attitudes towards objects which 

 constitute mental phenomena is a problem for philosophy, 

 but the difference between love and hate is not a difference 

 of form or structure, and therefore belongs rather to the 

 special science of psychology than to philosophy. Thus 

 the ethical interests which have often inspired philo 

 sophers must remain in the background : some kind of 

 ethical interest may inspire the whole study, but none 

 must obtrude in the detail or be expected in the special 

 results which are sought. 



If this view seems at first sight disappointing, we may 

 remind ourselves that a similar change has been found 

 necessary in all the other sciences. The physicist or 

 chemist is not now required to prove the ethical im 

 portance of his ions or atoms ; the biologist is not 

 expected to prove the utility of the plants or animals 



