174 MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 



is given, and I am convinced that none can be given, for 

 the assertion that dream-objects are not &quot; there &quot; and 

 not &quot; given.&quot; Let us take the second point first 



(1) The belief that dream-objects are not given comes, 

 I think, from failure to distinguish, as regards waking 

 life, between the sense-datum and the corresponding 

 &quot; thing/ In dreams, there is no such corresponding 

 &quot; thing &quot; as the dreamer supposes ; if, therefore, the 

 &quot; thing &quot; were given in waking life, as e.g. Meinong 

 maintains, 1 then there would be a difference in respect of 

 givenness between dreams and waking life. But if, as 

 we have maintained, what is given is never the thing, but 

 merely one of the &quot; sensibilia &quot; which compose the thing, 

 then what we apprehend in a dream is just as much given 

 as what we apprehend in waking life. 



Exactly the same argument applies as to the dream- 

 objects being &quot; there.&quot; They have their position in the 

 private space of the perspective of the dreamer ; where 

 they fail is in their correlation with other private spaces 

 and therefore with perspective space. But in the only 

 sense in which &quot; there &quot; can be a datum, they are &quot; there &quot; 

 just as truly as any of the sense-data of waking life. 



(2) The conception of &quot; illusion &quot; or &quot; unreality,&quot; and 

 the correlative conception of &quot; reality,&quot; are generally 

 used in a way which embodies profound logical con 

 fusions. Words that go in pairs, such as &quot; real &quot; and 

 &quot;unreal,&quot; &quot;existent&quot; and &quot;non-existent,&quot; &quot;valid&quot; 

 and &quot; invalid,&quot; etc., are all derived from the one funda 

 mental pair, &quot;true&quot; and &quot;false.&quot; Now &quot;true&quot; and 

 &quot; false &quot; are applicable only except in derivative signifi 

 cations to propositions. Thus wherever the above pairs 

 can be significantly applied, we must be dealing either 

 with propositions or with such incomplete phrases as 



1 Die Erfahrungsgrundlagen unseres Wissens, p. 28. 



