KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE 225 



If we are to preserve the duality of meaning a^id denota 

 tion, we have to say, with Meinong, that there are such 

 objects as the golden mountain and the round square, 

 although these objects do not have being. We even have 

 to admit that the existent round square is existent, but 

 does not exist. 1 Meinong does not regard this as a con 

 tradiction, but I fail to see that it is noJ,Dne. Indeed, it 

 seems to me evident that the judgment t there is no such 

 object as the round square&quot;; does not presuppose that 

 there is such an object. If this is admitted, however, we 

 are led to the conclusion that, by parity of form, no judg 

 ment concerning &quot; the so-and-so &quot; actually involves the 

 so-and-so as a constituent. 



Miss Jones 2 contends that there is no difficulty in admit 

 ting^, contradictory predicates concerning such an object 

 as (Jthe present King of France, ! on the ground that this 

 object is in itself contradictory. &quot;&quot;Now it might, of course, 

 be argued that this object, unlike the round square, is 

 not self -contradictory, but merely non-existent. This, 

 however, would not go to the root of the matter. The 

 real objection to such an argument is that the law of 

 contradiction ought not to be stated in the traditional 

 form &quot; A is not both B and not B,&quot; but in the form &quot; nc 

 proposition is both true and false.&quot; The traditional form 

 only applies to certain propositions, namely, to those 

 which attribute a predicate to a subject. When the law 

 is stated of propositions, instead of being stated concern 

 ing subjects and predicates, it is at once evident that 

 propositions about the present King of France or the 

 round square can form no exception, but are just as in 

 capable of being both true and false as other propositions. 

 Miss Jones 8 argues that &quot; Scott is the author of 



1 Meinong, Utber Annahmen, 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1910, p. 141. 

 1 Mind, July, 1910, p. 380. * Mind, July, 1910, p. 379. 



