THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BELIEF. 215 



ledge ; and they seem to me to bear much the same relation to 

 it, that our furniture has to the building in which we put it. The 

 walls (arc or ought to be) solid and enduring ; so is everything 

 that deserves to be called knowledge. Kach stone supports, and 

 is supported by, the rest ; and nothing but a weakness of its 

 foundation or a decay of its material can make our fabric of 

 thought uninhabitable. But the beliefs with which we furnish it 

 have not the same durability. Adapted to meet our temporary 

 needs, they may be either poor in material, or but slightly put 

 together. A carpet wears out, and, when past shifiing and patch 

 ing, must be replaced by a new one ; a table or a chair breaks 

 down, and, after successive repairs, is discarded as no longer 

 serviceable. Or perhaps our requirements change ; and some 

 article which was at first made expressly in accordance with them, 

 proves no longer suitable to our needs ; so that, finding it in our 

 way, we wish to get rid of it. Some pieces of our furniture, again, 

 originally of more substantial make, have become faded and old- 

 fashioned ; but they may be family heirlooms, or we may have 

 ourselves become attached to them ; and so, not liking to discard 

 them altogether, we put them away in some dark corner, or perhaps 

 consign them to a seldom-visited lumber-room, where they rest 

 almost forgotten in their obscurity. But at last some ray of sun 

 shine throws a blighter light than usual upon our dark corner; or 

 the opening of the shutters of our lumber-room lets into it the 

 unwonted light of day ; and we then find our old sofas and four- 

 post beds so moth-eaten and decayed, that we turn them out of 

 our house instanter. 



I shall not pursue this comparison at present, but propose to 

 resume and develop it hereafter. 



Although belief, as Dr. Reid truly says, &quot;admits of all degrees, 

 from the slightest suspicion to the fullest assurance,&quot; yet we 

 commonly use the term to designate that form of assent to any 

 particular proposition, which, while falling short of positive cer 

 tainty, is yet sufficiently complete not only to serve as the basis of 

 our further reasoning, but to direct our course of action. And it 

 is chiefly in this sense that I shall use the term on the present 

 occasion ; distinguishing belief, on the one hand, from that com 

 plete assurance which constitutes positive knowledge, and, on the 



