THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BELIEF. 231 



as all sufficient, when it did not really meet one of the points 

 raised for the defence. Again, while treating the witnesses for the 

 Crown with the utmost consideration, assuming the truth of every 

 statement they may make, and placing every obstacle in the way 

 of the sifting of their testimony by cross-examination, he treated 

 the witnesses for the defence as if they were utterly unworthy of 

 credit, and allowed the crown-counsel the utmost licence in his 

 endeavour to lower the value of their testimony by unjustifiable 

 insinuations or bu lying assumptions. And in his &quot;summing-up,&quot; 

 he would so forcibly present to the jury both the law and the 

 evidence on one side, and so determinately keep down the force 

 of law and evidence on the other, that the jury might be honestly 

 compelled, even against their own prepossessions, to give a most 

 iniquitous verdict. 



And so in the discussion of a question of intellectual truth, the 

 will has the power of keeping some considerations more or less 

 completely out of view, whilst it increases the force of others by 

 fixing the attention upon them. Another familiar proverb, that 

 &quot; there are none so blind as those that won t see,&quot; precisely 

 expresses the way in which the will thus exerts its influence. 

 For as the opponents of the Copernican system refused to look 

 at the satellites of Jupiter through the telescope of Galileo, so there 

 are too many who wilfully turn away the eyes of their minds from 

 inconvenient truths ; or refuse to get a gleam of sunshine into 

 the dark chambers of their intellects, where they hide as sacred 

 treasures the antiquated beliefs of past ages, the worthlessness 

 of which would be at once apparent if the full light of day were 

 permitted to shine in upon them. 



On the other hand, the will, when inspired by the habitual 

 desire to act on the highest principles of right, determinately 

 blinds us, not only to the direct promptings of self interest, but 

 to those arguments which we instinctively feel to be sophistical, 

 though we may not be able logically to expose their fallacy ; just 

 as Nelson at Copenhagen turned his blind eye to the signal for 

 his recall, which he did not think it for the honour of his country 

 to obey. 



But we must now carry this inquiry a step further back ; and 

 consider where the responsibility lies for the construction of that 



