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lary ; for the deceiving of the senses is one of the plea 

 sures of the senses. As for games of recreation, I hold 

 them to belong to civil life and education. And thus 

 much of that particular human philosophy which con 

 cerns the body, which is but the tabernacle of the 

 mind. 



XI. 1. For human knowledge which concerns the 

 mind, it hath two parts ; the one that inquireth of 

 the substance or nature of the soul or mind, the other 

 that inquireth of the faculties or functions thereof. 

 Unto the first of these, the considerations of the original 

 of the soul, whether it be native or adventive, and how 

 far it is exempted from laws of matter, and of the 

 immortality thereof, and many other points, do apper 

 tain : which have been not more laboriously inquired 

 than variously reported ; so as the travail therein 

 taken seemeth to have been rather in a maze than in 

 a way. But although I am of opinion that this know 

 ledge may be more really and soundly inquired, even 

 in nature, than it hath been ; yet I hold that in the 

 end it must be bounded by religion, or else it will be 

 subject to deceit and delusion. For as the substance 

 of the soul in the creation was not extracted out of the 

 mass of heaven and earth by the benediction of a 

 producat, but was immediately inspired from God, so 

 it is not possible that it should be (otherwise than by 

 accident) subject to the laws of heaven and earth, 

 which are the subject of philosophy ; and therefore the 

 true knowledge of the nature and state of the soul 

 must come by the same inspiration that gave the sub 

 stance. Unto this part of knowledge touching the 

 soul there be two appendices ; which, as they have 

 been handled, have rather vapoured forth fables than 

 kindled truth ; divination and fascination. 



2. Divination hath been anciently and fitly divided 

 into artificial and natural ; whereof artificial is, when 

 the mind maketh a prediction by argument, conclud 

 ing upon signs and tokens ; natural is, when the mind 

 hath a presentation by an internal power, without the 

 inducement of a sign. Artificial is of two sorts ; 



