144 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING 



beginning the definitions of our words and terms, that 

 others may know how we accept and understand them, 

 and whether they concur with us or no. For it cometh 

 to pass, for want of this, that we are sure to end there 

 where we ought to have begun, which is, in questions 

 and differences about words. To conclude therefore, 

 it must be confessed that it is not possible to divorce 

 ourselves from these fallacies and false appearances, 

 because they are inseparable from our nature and con 

 dition of life ; so yet nevertheless the caution of them 

 (for all clenches, as was said, are but 

 SaHni^rive caut i ns ) doth extremely import the true 

 deidolisani. conduct of human judgement. The 

 mi humani particular elenches or cautions against 

 a dventifiis. these three false appearances, I find 



altogether deficient. 



12. There remaineth one part of judgement of great 

 excellency, which to mine understanding is so slightly 

 touched, as I may report that also deficient ; which is 

 the application of the differing kinds of proofs to the 

 differing kinds of subjects. For there being but four 

 kinds of demonstrations, that is, by the immediate con 

 sent of the mind or sense, by induction, by syllogism, and 

 by congruity, which is that which Aristotle calleth 

 demonstration in orb or circle, and not a notioribus, 

 every of these hath certain subjects in the matter of 

 sciences, in which respectively they have chief est use ; 

 and certain others, from which respectively they ought 

 to be excluded ; and the rigour and curiosity in re 

 quiring the more severe proofs in some things, and 

 chiefly the facility in contenting ourselves with the 

 more remiss proofs in others, hath been amongst 

 the greatest causes of detriment and 

 hindrance to knowledge. The distribu- 

 fionu.ini &quot; tions and assignations of demonstrations, 

 according to the analogy of sciences, I 

 note as deficient. 



XV. 1. The custody or retaining of knowledge is 

 either in writing or memory ; whereof writing hath two 

 parts, the nature of the character, and the order of 



