INTERESTS NOT ALWAYS IDENTICAL. 661 



September, 1874; an injunction was granted &quot;including all the 

 railroads of the State,&quot; and the Wisconsin Kailroad war closed 

 in the declaration, through the President of the Chicago, Mil 

 waukee and St. Paul Eailroad Company, that, &quot;as law-abiding- 

 citizens, the railroads would at once conform to the decision of 

 the Court, and endeavor to obey it, in good faith, until it should 

 be reversed by a decision of the Supreme Court of the United 

 States, or until the law was repealed by the Legislature.&quot; 



These two reports are an education in railroading, and we 

 commend their careful reading to every Patron who desires to 

 secure the great ends of these exhaustive investigations. The 

 fact that the conclusions arrived at by these two independent 

 committees are so nearly identical, seems to give them such ad 

 ditional weight as to justify the large space given them in this 

 work: 



To a considerable extent, the interests of the railroad corporations 

 and the public are in harmony; thus it is clearly for the real interest 

 of the corporations to build good and safe roads, and upon lines 

 that will accommodate the largest number of people and the great 

 est amount of traffic; and yet, practically, they not unfrequently 

 disregard both these elements : 



First, because the wisdom and foresight that should eminently 

 characterize the management of railways are often wanting; and, 



Secondly, because the managers are not unfrequently in their 

 places for the sole purpose of promoting their own personal ends. 

 But again, there are cases in which the interest of railway corpora 

 tions and the public are opposed. For example, it is the interest of 

 the companies to prevent the building of competing roads; to ham 

 per and embarrass rival lines already established; to force such traffic 

 as they are able to command over as much of their own lines re 

 spectively as possible, though it be at the expense of time and other 

 advantage on the part of the shipper. 



For all these reasons, and others that might be named, the insuffi 

 ciency of self-interest on the part of companies, as a protection to 

 the public, has been long recognized. 



Again, competition is an unequal reliance, though it is so invari 

 ably applicable as a restraint in all sorts of trades, professions, and 

 ordinary commercial enterprises, that it is not surprising how long 

 it has misled the public and legislative bodies. It always serves as 

 a protection where it is full and permanently maintained, as well in 

 matters of transportation as in the case of the trades and most in 

 dividual enterprises. But therein lies the difficulty. Competition 

 implies freedom of the operator, both as to material and forces. In 

 case of the ordinary avocations, this freedom is practically quite 

 complete; the materials and the labor to be used can be had in the 

 open market, and fair purchase is protected by the active interest of 

 those who have them to sell. 



With regard to competition between railroad companies, this nat- 

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