iltl.] Tllti FAtitfi OF itiRSEtTS INTERPRETED.. 109 



occasion, the facility, and advantage of a war, are to be re 

 garded instead of vicinity. Thus Perseus, though an eastern 

 prince, readily undertook an expedition into the remotest 

 parts of the western world. An opposite instance of the 

 wisdom of this precept occurs in the different strategy of 

 war practised by Philip and Alexander. For Philip urged 

 war only on the frontiers of his empire, and with great strife 

 and peril barely succeeded in bringing a few cities under his 

 rule, but Alexander carried his invading arms into distant 

 countries; and with a felicitous boldness undertook an ex 

 pedition against Persia, and subduing multitudinous nations 

 on his journey, rested at last rather fatigued with conquest 

 than with arms. This policy is further borne out by the 

 propagation of the Koman power ; for at the time that the 

 arms of this martial people on the side of the west stretched 

 no further than Liguria, they had brought under their 

 dominion all the provinces of the East as far as Mount 

 Taurus. In like manner, Charles the Eighth, finding a war 

 with Great Britain attended with some dangers, directed his 

 enterprise against Naples, which he subdued with wonderful 

 rapidity and ease. One of the causes of these wonderful 

 successes in distant wars, is the low state of discipline and 

 equipment, which invites the attack of the invading power, 

 and the terror which is generally struck into the enemy from 

 the bold audacity of the enterprise. Nor can the enemy 

 retaliate or effect any reciprocal invasion, which always re 

 sults from a war waged with the frontier nations. But the 

 chief point is, that in subduing a neighbouring state the 

 choice of stratagems is narrowed by circumstances ; but in a 

 distant expedition, a man may roll the tide of war where 

 the military discipline is most relaxed, or where the strength 

 of the nation is most torn and wasted by civil discord, or in 

 whatever part the enemy can be the most easily subjugated. 

 The second precept is, that the cause of the war be just 

 and honourable; for this adds alacrity both to the soldiers 

 and the people who find the supplies, procures aids, al 

 liances, and numerous other conveniences. Now, there is 

 no cause of war more just and laudable than the suppressing 

 of tyranny, by which a people are dispirited, benumbed, or 

 left without life and vigour, as at the sight of Medusa. Such 

 heroic acts transformed Hercules into a divinity. It was 

 undoubtedly a point of religion with the Romans to aid v, ith 



