CHAP. IV.] FINAL CAUSES, HOW ABUSED. 141 



kind of knowledge, though in a more divine manner: &quot;Non 

 arctabuntur gressus tui, et currens non habebis offendiculum.&quot; 6 

 Thus denoting that the paths of wisdom are not liable to 

 straits and perplexities. 



The second part of metaphysics, is the inquiry of final 

 causes, which we note not as wanting, but as ill-placed ; these 

 causes being usually sought in physics, notin metaphysics, to 

 the great prejudice of philosophy ; for^ne treating of final 

 causes in physics has driven out the inquiry of physical ones, 

 and made men rest in specious and shadowy causes, without 

 ever searching in earnest after such as are real and trulj 

 physical. / And this was not only done by Plalo^ who con- 

 stantly imchors upon this shore ; but by Aristotle, Galen, 

 and others, who frequently introduce such causes as these : 

 &quot; The hairs of the eyelids are for a fence to the sight. The 

 bones for pillars whereon to build the bodies of animals. 

 The leaves of trees are to defend the fruit from the sun and 

 wind. The clouds are designed for watering the earth,&quot; &amp;lt;fec. 

 /All which are properly alleged in metaphysics ; but in 

 physics are impertinent, and as remoras to the ship, that 

 hinder the sciences from holding on their course of improve 

 ment, and introducing a neglect of searching after physical 

 causes. And therefore the natural philosophies of Democritus 

 and others, who allow no God or mind in the frame of things, 

 but attribute the structure of the universe to infinite essays 

 and trials of nature, or what they call fate or fortune, and 

 assigned the causes of particular things to the necessity of 

 matter without any intermixture of final causes, seem, so far 

 as we can judge from the remains of their philosophy, much 

 more solid, and to have gone deeper into i^ature^wjth regard 

 to physical causes, than the philosophy of Aristotle or Plato; 

 and this only because they never meddled with final causes, 

 which the others were perpetually inculcating. Though in 

 this respect Aristotle is more culpable than Plato, as banish 

 ing Gocl, d the fountain of final causes, and substituting nature 



b Prov. iv. 12. c Cf. e. g. Arist. Phys. ii. 8. 



a From the text it must not be judged that Aristotle invested nature 

 with the general powers usually attributed to a divine intelligence, in 

 designing and executing her various ends with wisdom and precision, but 

 only that he regarded nature as an active and intelligent principle per 

 forming her agencies by means palpable to hersell, yet according to tht 1 

 laws and faculties couterred upon h&amp;lt; r by UIH prijue mover ol things. Th 



