142 ADVANCEMENT OP LEARNING. [BOOK III. 



in his stead j and, at the same time, receiving final causes 

 through his affection to logic, not theology. / 



These final causes, however, are not false, or unworthy of 

 inquiry in metaphysics, but their excursion into the limits of 

 physical causes hath made a great devastation in that pro 

 vince ; otherwise, when contained within their own bounds, 



Spinozist principle -which the text attributes to the Stagyrite has been 

 understood by many critics 01 the sensational school to intimate that 

 Aristotle was of their way of thinking, though the idea of an independent 

 material intelligence is expressly contradicted by numerous passages in 

 liis Metaphysics. In book xii. chap. 5, of the works which go under 

 this name, the principal being is held to exclude the idea oi matter from 

 his nature: tTi roivvv ravraz cti ouaiag ilvai dvev v\i]Q aidiovg yap 

 cd K.r.X.; and (ibid. 8) TO CE TI ijv tivai OVK t\ti v\r)v TO irpuirov 

 ivTt\i%tia yp. In chap. 7 he affirms this principle to be spirit, &quot;PX 7 / 

 &amp;gt;! vor)ai; that matter cannot move oi itself, but needs the action ol an 

 ex cerior agent, ou yap r) ye vXrj Kivrjnu av~&amp;gt;} iavrrjv, dXXd rtK-oviKi} 

 and that this principle must be eternal and active, Aiciov KOI ovvia 

 Kai ivipytia ovaa. Aristotle further proceeds to show that all other 

 beings are only a species of means transmitting the motion to others 

 which have been communicated to them, but that this primary being, 

 possessing the spring of motion in itself, moves without being moved; 

 illustrating this kind of action by the emotions and deeds that spring from 

 the love, pity, or hatred that agents at rest excite in others. In another 

 place he affirms that this being is not only eternal in duration but 

 immutable in essence, and quite distinct from sensible things: on jap 

 tanv ovaia TIQ ciiciof /cat d&amp;lt;ii T]TOQ teal Kf%(i)pi(f}ikvr} TMV ala9r)Ti!ji&amp;gt;, 

 Qai tpuv tK TCjv flptjutvidV and that heaven and nature hang upon its 

 behests, in Toiavrjjg dpa ap^iis ?/pr^rai o ovpavog cai ? / &amp;lt;J&amp;gt;VGIQ. He 

 further shows that life belongs to it by essence, and as the action of 

 intelligence is life, and vice versa, essential action constitutes the eternal 

 life of this being. Aristotle then calls this independent principle Goa, 

 and assigns to it endless duration: Qautv ce TOV 9EO N ilvm %wov ttoi/ 

 apiarov. &quot;It remains,&quot; says the Stagyrite, &quot;to determine whether 

 this principle be one or several ; but upon this point we need only 

 remember that those who have decided for a plurality have advanced 

 nothing worthy of consideration in support of their belief.&quot; AXXd 

 fjLtUvfiaOai Kai rag rOJv aXXw&amp;gt; 7ro0a(Tti(; ore Trtpi 7T\j ]9ovQ ovct (.loi i- 

 Kaaiv o TI Kai aatyic; tiirtiv t (Ibid. chap. 8.) &quot;For the principle oi exist 

 ence, or the immovable being which is the source of all movement, 

 being pure action, and consequently foreign to matter, is one in reason 

 and number .... all the rest is the creation of a mythology invented 

 by politicians to advance the public interest and occupy the attention of 

 mankind.&quot; To Ce. TI ijv tlvai OVK t\ti V\TJV TO Trpurov ivTi\i\tia yap. 

 (Supp. note 1.) &quot;E^/ity dpa Kai Xoyy Kai apifyup TO Trpwrov icivouv 

 dxivijTov. (Ibid. chap. 8.) Ta dk Xoi/ra p,vOiKu&amp;gt;^ 7/0^ Trpodrj^O?; Trpog rfjv 



TTllQij) TWV 7TO\\MV Kttl 7Tp6f T)]V tl TOVf VOUOV Kttl TO 



\pf]&amp;lt;riv. (Ibid.) Ed. 



