BOOK v.] OfijfiCt OP io&tc AJfb frinic 181 



in air ; which, though weak and feeble, is proportioned to 

 the visual organs of such creatures, so as to suffice tliern fo* 

 sight. The error, as in most other cases, lies here, that men 

 have not deduced the common forms of things from par 

 ticular instances, which is what we make the proper business 

 of metaphysics. Therefore let inquiry be made into the 

 form and origins of light ; and, in the mean time, we set it 

 down as deficient. And so much for the doctrine ol the 

 substance of the soul, both rational and sensitive, with i\a 

 faculties, and the appendages of this doctrine. 



FIFTH BOOK. 



CHAPTER I. 



Division of the Use and Objects of the Faculties of the Soul into Loglo 

 and Ethics. Division of Logic into the Arts of Invention, Judg 

 ment, Memory, and Tradition. 



THE doctrine of the human understanding, and of the 

 human will, excellent king, are like twins ; for the purity of 

 illumination, and the freedom of will, began and fell together : 

 nor is there in the universe so intimate a sympathy, as that 

 betwixt truth and goodness. The more shame for men of 

 learning, if in knowledge they are like the winged angels, 

 but in affections like the crawling serpents, having their 

 minds indeed like a mirror ; but a mirror foully spotted. 



The doctrine of the use and objects of the mental facul 

 ties has two parts, well known and generally received ; viz., 

 logic and ethics. Logic treats of the understanding and 

 reason, and ethics of the will, appetite, and affections ; the 

 one producing resolutions, the other actions. The imagina 

 tion, indeed, on both sides, performs the office of agent, or 

 ambassador, and assists alike in the judicial, and ministerial 

 capacity. Sense commits all sorts of notions to the imagi 

 nation, and the reason afterwards judges of them. In like 

 manner reason transmits select and approved notions to th 



