CAl. II.] EFFECTS OF THE SYLLOGISM, 187 



formed by the common induction, or by sense and experience, 

 yet it is certain that the lower axioms cannot, in natural 

 things, be with certainty deduced by syllogism from them. 

 For syllogism reduces propositions to principles by inter 

 mediate propositions. And this form, whether of invention 

 or proof* has place in the popular sciences, as ethics, politics, 

 law, &amp;lt;fec., and even in divinity, since God has been pi eased to 

 accommodate himself to the human capacity ; but in physics, 

 where nature is to be caught by works, and not the adversary 

 by argument, truth in this way slips through our fingers, 

 because the subtilty of the operations of nature far exceeds 

 the subtilty of words. So that syllogism thus failing, there 

 is everywhere a necessity for employing a genuine and cor 

 rect induction, as well in the more general principles, as 

 the inferior propositions. For syllogisms consist of propo 

 sitions, propositions of words, but words are the signs of 

 notions ; wherefore if these notions, which are the souls of 

 words, be unjustly and unsteadily abstracted from things, the 

 whole structure must fall. Nor can any laborious subsequent 

 examination of the consequences of arguments, or the truth 

 of propositions, ever repair the ruin ; for the error lies in the 

 first digestion, which cannot be rectified by t;ie secondary 

 functions of nature. 



It was not, therefore, without cause, that many of the 

 ancient philosophers, and some of them eminent in their 

 way, became academics and sceptics, who denied all certainty 

 of human knowledge, and held that the understanding went 

 no further than appearance and probability. It is true, 

 some are of opinion that Socrates, when he declared himself 

 certain of nothing, did it only in the way of irony, and put 

 on the dissimulation of knowledge, that by renouncing what 

 he certainly knew, he might be thought to know what he 

 was ignorant of. Nor in the latter academy, which Cicero 

 followed, was this opinion held with much reality ; but 

 those who excelled in eloquence, commonly chose this sect as 

 the fittest for their purpose, viz., acquiring the reputation ot 

 disputing copiously on both sides of the question, thus 

 leaving the high road of truth for private walks of pleasure. 

 Yet it is certain there were some few, both in the old and 

 new academies, but more among the Sceptics, who held this 

 principle of doubting in simplicity and sincerity of heart* 



