CHAP. III.] TOPICS GENERAL AND SPECIAL, 199 



common logics, tnat we need not dwell upon its explanation : 

 we only observe by the way, that this topical method is not 

 only used in argumentation and close conference, but also 

 in contemplation, when we meditate or revolve anything 

 alone. Nor is its office only confined to the suggesting or 

 admonishing us of what should be affirmed or asserted, but 

 also what we should examine or question ; a prudent ques 

 tioning being a kind of half-knowledge ; for, as Plato justly 

 observes, a searcher must have some general notion of the 

 thing he searches after, otherwise he could never know it 

 when he had found it ;& and therefore, the more comprehen 

 sive and sure our anticipation is, the more direct and short 

 will be the investigation. And hence the same topics which 

 conduce to the close examining into our own understandings, 

 and collecting the notices there treasured up, are likewise 

 assistant in drawing forth our knowledge. Thus, if a person, 

 skilful in the point under question, were at hand, as we 

 might prudently and advantageously consult him upon it ; in 

 like manner, we may usefully select and turn over authors 

 and books, to instruct and inform ourselves about those 

 things we are in quest of. 



But the particular topical invention is much more con 

 ducive to the same purposes, and to be esteemed a highly 

 fertile thing. Some writers have lately mentioned it, but it 

 is by no means treated according to its extent and merit. 

 Not to mention the error and haughtiness which have too 

 long reigned in the schools, and their pursuing with infinite 

 subtilty such things as are obvious, without once touching 

 upon those that lie remote, we receive this topical invention 

 as an extremely useful thing, that affords certain heads of 

 inquiry and investigation appropriated to particular subjects 

 and sciences. These places are certain mixtures of logic and 

 the peculiar matter of each science. It is an idle thing, and 

 shows a narrow mind, to think that the art of discovering the 

 sciences may be invented and proposed in perfection from the 

 beginning, so as to be afterwards only exercised and brought 

 into use ; for men should be made sensible that the solid 

 and real arts of invention grow up and increase along with 

 inventions themselves ; so that when any one first comes to 



a In Menone, ii. 80, 



