236 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [BOOK VT. 



sufficient that things themselves were nakedly and simply 

 proposed and proved ; but, on the contrary, the affections 

 revolt so often, and raise such disturbances and seditions 



&quot; Video meliora, proboque ; 



Deteriora sequor,&quot;* 



that reason would perfectly be led captive, did not the per 

 suasion of eloquence win over the imagination from the side 

 of the passions, and promote an alliance betwixt it and 

 reason against the affections. For we must observe that the 

 affections themselves always aim at an apparent good, and in 

 this respect have something common with reason. But here 

 lies the difference, that the affections principally regard a 

 present good, whilst reason, seeing far before it, chooses also 

 the future and capital good. And therefore, as present things 

 strike the imagination strongest, reason is generally subdued ; 

 but when eloquence and the power of persuasion raise up 

 remote and future objects, and set them to view as if they 

 were present ; then imagination goes over to the side ol 

 reason, and renders it victorious. 



Hence we conclude, that rhetoric can no more be ac 

 cused of colouring the worst part, than logic of teaching 

 sophistry. For we know that the doctrines of contraries are 

 the same, though their use be opposite ; and logic does not 

 only differ from rhetoric, according to the vulgar notion, as 

 the first is like the hand clenched, and the other like the 

 hand open ; but much more in this, that logic considers 

 reason in its natural state, and rhetoric as it stands in vulgar 

 opinion ; whence Aristotle prudently places rhetoric be 

 tween logic and ethics, along with politics, as partaking of 

 them both. For the proofs and demonstrations of logic are 

 common to all mankind, but the proof and persuasion of 

 rhetoric must be varied according to the audience, like a 

 musician suiting himself to different ears. 



&quot; Orpheus in sylvis, inter Delphinas Arion.&quot; k 



And this application and variation of speech should, if we 

 desire its perfection, extend so far, that if the same things 

 were to be delivered to different persons, yet a different set 

 of words should be used to each. 1 Though it is certain that 



f Ovid, Metam. vii. 20. h Virg. Eel. viii. 56. 



1 For one of the most perfect exemplifica.tion.s of this rule, see Lord 



