CiiAP. III.] RHETORICAL SOPHISMS EXEMPtlFlfitX 239 



deceit ; for those who praise cr dispiaise commonly have 

 their own views in it, and speak not their real sentiments. 



&quot; Laudat venales, qui vult extrudere, merces.&quot;P 

 &quot; It is faulty, it is faulty, says the buyer; but when he is gone, 

 he congratulates himself upon the bargain.&quot; 1 3. Through 

 party ; for men immoderately extol those of their own and 

 depress those of the opposite party. 4. Through disposition 

 or temper; for some men are naturally formed servile and 

 fawning, and others captious and morose ; so that when 

 such persons praise or dispraise, they do but gratify their 

 humour, without much regard to truth. 



II. What is commended, even by an enemy, is a great good; but what is 

 censured, even by a friend, a great evil. 



The fallacy seems to lie here, that it is easily believed the 

 force of truth extorts from us what we speak against our 

 inclination. 



This colour deceives through the subtilty both of friends 

 and enemies. For praises of enemies are not always against 

 their will, nor forced from them by truth ; but they choose 

 to bestow them where they may create envy or danger to 

 their adversary. Hence the foolish conceit was current 

 among the Greeks, that he who was praised by another with 

 malicious intent, never failed to have his nose disfigured with 

 a pustule. Again this colour deceives, because enemies some 

 times use praises like prefaces, that they may the more freely 

 calumniate afterwards. On the other side, it deceives by the 

 craft of friends, who also sometimes acknowledge our faults, 

 and speak of them not as compelled thereto by any force of 

 truth, but touch only such as may do little hurt, and make 

 us, in everything else, the best men in the world. And 

 lastly, it deceives, because friends also use their reproofs, as 

 enemies do their commendations, by way of preface, that 

 they may afterwards launch out more fully in our praises. 



III. To be deprived of a good, is an evil; and to be deprived of an evil, 

 a good. 



This colour deceives two ways ; viz., cither by the com 

 parison of good and evil, or by the sue session of good to 

 good, or evil to evil. 1; By comparison : thus if it were 

 good for mankind to be deprived of acorns, it follows noi 



P Hot. Epist. ii. 11. * Prcv. u. 



