ADVANCEMENT Of LEARNING. [BOOK VI. 



pared with the degree from power to action ; for the degree 

 from want of power to power seems greater than that from 

 power to action. 



X. What relates to truth is greater than what relates to opinion ; but the 

 measure and trial of what relates to opinion is what a man would not do 

 if he thought he were secret. 



So the Epicureans pronounce of the stoical felicity placed 

 in virtue, that it is the felicity of a player, who, left by his 

 audience, would soon sink in his spirit; whence they in ridi 

 cule call virtue a theatrical good; but it is otherwise in 

 riches 



&quot; Populus me sibilat ; at inihi plaudo,&quot; d 

 and pleasure, 



&quot; Grata sub inio 



Gaudia corde premens, vultu simulante pudorem,&quot;* 



which are felt more inwardly. 



The fallacy of this colour is somewhat subtile, though the 

 answer to the example be easy, as virtue is not chosen lor 

 the sake of popular fame, and as every one ought principally 

 to reverence himself; so that a virtuous man will be vir 

 tuous in a desert as well as a theatre, though perhaps virtue is 

 made somewhat more vigorous by praise, as heat by reflec 

 tion. But this only denies the supposition, and does not 

 expose the fallacy. Allowing, then, that virtue, joined with 

 labour, would not be chosen but for the praise and fame 

 which usually attend it, yet it is no consequence that virtue 

 should not be desired principally for its own sake, since fame 

 may be only an impellent, and not a constituent or efficient 

 cause. Thus, if when tw r o horses are rode without the spur, 

 one of them performs better than the other, but with the 

 spur the other far exceeds, this will be judged the better 

 horse : and to say that his mettle lies in the spur, is not 

 making a true judgment; for since the spur is a com 

 mon instrument in horsemanship, and no impediment or 

 burthen to the horse, he will not be esteemed the worse 

 horse that wants it, but the going well without it is rather 

 a point of delicacy than perfection. So glory and honour are 

 the spurs to virtue, which, though it might languish without 

 them, yet since they are always at hand unsought, virtue if 



Hor. i. Sat. i. 68. Ibid. 



