CHAP. 1.] MAN S DUTY TO SOCIETT. 273 



Again, upon the foundation above laid we may confute 

 the philosophy 01&quot; Epictetus, which rests upon supposing feli 

 city placed in things within our power, lest we should other 

 wise be exposed to fortune and contingency as if it were not 

 much happier to fail of success in just and honourable de 

 signs, when that failure makes for the public good, than to 

 secure an uninterrupted enjoyment of those things which 

 make only for our private fortune. Thus Gonsalvo at the 

 head of his army, pointing to F&quot;^ples, nobly protested he had 

 much rather, by advancing a step, meet certain death, than 

 by retiring a step prolong his life. And to this agrees the 

 wise king, who pronounces &quot; a good conscience to be a con 

 tinual feast ;&quot;i thereby signifying that the consciousness of 

 good intentions, however unsuccessful, affords a joy more 

 real, pure, and agreeable to nature, than all the other means 

 that can be furnished, either for obtaining one s desires or 

 quieting the mind. 



It likewise censures that abuse which prevailed about the 

 time of Epictetus, when philosophy was turned into a cer 

 tain art or profession of life, as if its design were not to com 

 pose and quiet troubles, but to avoid and remove the causes 

 and occasions thereof, whence a particular regimen was to be 

 entered into for obtaining this end, by introducing such a 

 kind of health into the mind as was that of Herodicus in the 

 body, mentioned by Aristotle, 1 &quot; whilst he did nothing all hid 

 life long but take care of his health, and therefore abstained 

 from numberless things, which almost deprived him of the 

 use of his body ; whereas, it men were determined to perform 

 the duties of society, that kind of bodily health is most 

 desirable which is able to suffer and support all sorts of 

 attacks and alterations. In the same manner, that mind is 

 truly sound and strong which is able to break through 

 numerous and great temptations and disorders ; whence 

 Diogenes seems to have justly commended the habit which 

 did not warily abstain, but courageously sustain, 8 which 

 could check the sallies of the soul on the steepest precipice, 

 and make it, like a well-broken horse, stop and turn at the 

 shortest warning. 



Lastly, it reproves that delicacy and unsociable temper 



r. Arrian. i. * Piov. xv. 15. Rhet. L 5, 10. 



* di t\ov aif t\(tv. Summa Stoic. Philos. 



