CttA* Hi.] FORMATION Of HABITS. 289 



mind is best, and the other when it is worst disposed for 

 business ; that by the former, the greater despatch may be 

 made ; and by the latter, the obstructions of the mind may 

 be borne down with a strenuous application ; whence the 

 intermediate times slide away the more easily and agreeably. 



The third example shall be the precept which Aristotle 

 transiently mentions ; viz., to endeavour our utmost against 

 that whereto we are strongly impelled by nature ; thus, as 

 it were, rowing against the stream, or bending a crooked 

 stick the contrary way, in order to bring it straight. 



A fourth precept may be founded on this sure principle ; 

 that the mind is easier, and more agreeably drawn on to 

 those things which are not principally intended by the 

 operator, but conquered or obtained without premeditated 

 design, because our nature is such, as in a manner hates to 

 be commanded. There are many other useful precepts for 

 the regulating of custom ; and if custom be prudently and 

 skiliully introduced, it really becomes a second nature ; but 

 if unskilfully and casually treated, it will be but the ape ot 

 nature, and imitate nothing to the life, or awkwardly, and 

 with deformity. 



So, with regard to books, studies, and influence over our 

 manners, there are numerous useful rules and directions. 

 One of the fathers, in great severity, called poetry the devil s 

 wine ; as indeed it begets many temptations, desires, and 

 vain opinions. And it is a very prudent saying of Aristotle, 

 deserving to be well considered, that &quot; young men are im- 

 _jm)per heargrs of moral philosophy,&quot; 8 because the heat of 

 their passions is not yet allayed and tempered by time and 

 experience. And to say the truth, the reason why the 

 excellent writings and moral discourses of the ancients have 

 so little effect upon our lives and manners, seems to be, that 

 they are not usually read by men of ripe age and judgment, 

 but wholly left to unexperienced youths and children. And 

 are not young men much less fit for politics than for ethics, 

 before they are well seasoned with religion, and the doctrines 

 of morality and civility 1 ? For being, perhaps, depraved and cor 

 rupted in their judgment, they are apt to think that moral 

 differences are not real and solid ; but that all things are to 

 be measured by utility and success. Thus the poet said, 

 Nicom. Eth, ii. 95, towards the end. Nic. Eth. L 15. 



2 u 



